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Abstract
If there are fundamental laws of nature, can they fail to be exact? In this
paper, I consider the possibility that some fundamental laws are vague. I call this
phenomenon fundamental nomic vagueness. I characterize fundamental nomic
vagueness as the existence of borderline lawful worlds and the presence of several
other accompanying features. Under certain assumptions, such vagueness
prevents the fundamental physical theory from being completely expressible
in the mathematical language. Moreover, I suggest that such vagueness can be
regarded as vagueness in the world.
For a case study, we turn to the Past Hypothesis, a postulate that (partially)
explains the direction of time in our world. We have reasons to take it seriously
as a candidate fundamental law of nature. Yet it is vague: it admits borderline
(nomologically) possible worlds. An exact version would lead to an untraceable
arbitrariness absent in any other fundamental laws. However, the dilemma
between fundamental nomic vagueness and untraceable arbitrariness is dissolved
in a new quantum theory of time’s arrow.
Keywords: vagueness, exactness, higher-order vagueness, mathematical expressibil-
ity, epistemicism, arbitrariness, imprecise probability, laws of nature, time’s arrow, Past
Hypothesis, entropy, fundamentality, Humeanism, anti-Humeanism, density matrix
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1 Introduction
Vagueness is a pervasive feature of ordinary language. Many predicates we use in
everyday contexts do not have determinate boundaries of application. Is John bald
when he has exactly 5250 hairs on his head? There are determinate cases of “bald,”
but there are also borderline cases of “bald.” In other words, predicates such as
“bald” are indeterminate: there are individuals such that it is indeterminate whether
they are bald.1 Moreover, the boundaries between “bald” and “borderline bald” are
also indeterminate. Hence, there do not seem to be sharp boundaries anywhere. The
phenomenon of vagueness gives rise to many paradoxes (such as the sorites) and
serious challenges to classical logic.
We might expect that, at the level of fundamental physics, the kind of vagueness
that “infects” ordinary language should disappear. That is, the fundamental laws of
physics, the predicates they invoke, and the properties they refer to should be exact.2
The expectation is supported by the history of physics and the ideal that physics
should deliver an objective and precise description of nature. All the paradigm
cases of candidate fundamental laws of nature are not only simple and universal,
but also exact, in the sense that, for every class of worlds (or class of solutions),
fundamental laws either determinately apply or determinately fail. Suppose the
fundamental laws are Newton’s equation of motion F = ma and law of universal
gravitation F = Gm1m2/r2: there is no vagueness about whether a certain class of
worlds (described in terms of trajectories of point particles with Newtonian masses)
satisfies the conjunction.3
Fundamental nomic exactness—the ideal (roughly) that fundamental laws are
exact—supports an important principle about the (perfect) mathematical expressibil-
ity of fundamental laws. If some fundamental laws were vague, it would be difficult
1There are subtleties about how best to characterize vagueness. For reviews on vagueness and the
sorites, see Keefe and Smith (1996), Sorensen (2018), and Hyde and Raffman (2018).
2Penrose (2005) seems to hold that expectation. I used to expect that, but considerations of the
arguments in this paper convinced me otherwise. Here, we assume that there are fundamental laws
of nature and it is the aspiration of physics to discover them. At the level of non-fundamental physics,
and in the special sciences, the ideal of exactness may still be important but not absolute.
3An alleged violation of the expectation concerns the measurement axioms of orthodox quantum
theory, which I discuss in §2.5. Another case concerns the constants and the observables of effective
field theory (EFT). See Miller (2020). Since he is not focused on “fuzziness,” Miller’s proposal is best
construed as a theory of ontic imprecision, not ontic or fundamental nomic vagueness.
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to describe them mathematically in a perfectly faithful way that genuinely respects
their vagueness and does not impose sharp boundaries anywhere. The kind of
mathematics we are used to, built from a set-theoretic foundation, does not lend itself
naturally to model the genuine fuzziness of vagueness. One could go further: the
language of mathematics and the language of fundamental physics are supposed to
be exemplars for the “ideal language,” a language that is exact, suggested in Frege’s
Begriffsschrift, Russell’s logical atomism, and Leibniz’s characteristica universalis. The
successful application of mathematical equations in formulating physical laws seems
to leave no room for vagueness to enter into a fundamental physical theory. If vague-
ness is not perfectly mathematically expressible, and if there is fundamental nomic
vagueness, then the fundamental physical theory is not perfectly mathematically
expressible.4
Interestingly, little is written about the connection between vagueness and
fundamental laws of nature. The topic is philosophically and scientifically important,
with ramifications for metaphysics, philosophy of science, and foundations of physics.
What does it mean for a fundamental law to be vague? Are there examples of vague
fundamental laws that may obtain in a world like ours? What does fundamental
nomic vagueness mean for the metaphysical status and mathematical expressibility
of fundamental laws? How does it relate to ontic vagueness? This paper is an
attempt to address some of those questions.
First (§2), I propose an account of fundamental nomic vagueness, distinguish it
from approximations, and discuss its implications for nomic possibility and necessity.
Although it differs from standard cases of ontic vagueness, it can be regarded as
“vagueness in the world.” Fundamental nomic vagueness violates a principle called
fundamental exactness on certain anti-Humeanism but not on Humeanism about laws
of nature. (The first part of §2.1 may be skimmed by experts in vagueness.)
Second (§3), I focus on the case of the Past Hypothesis (PH), the postulate that
(roughly) the universe started in a special macrostate of low entropy. Given its role
in explaining the arrows of time in our world, we have reasons to take it seriously
as a fundamental law or at least an axiomatic postulate in physics that is on a par
with fundamental laws. Yet, macrostates are vague. Even when we specify an exact
level of entropy, PH remains vague: there will be borderline lawful worlds with
features of genuine fuzziness. An exact version of PH (which I call the Strong Past
Hypothesis) contains an objectionable kind of arbitrariness not found in any other
fundamental laws or dynamical constants—its exact boundary leaves no trace in the
material ontology, resulting in a gap between the nomic and the ontic. It violates a
theoretical virtue that I call traceability. (§3.1 may be skimmed by experts in statistical
mechanics.)
The case study highlights a dilemma between fundamental nomic vagueness
and untraceability. In §4, I suggest that, under some conditions, the dilemma can be
dissolved in a natural way. The conditions are realized in a new quantum theory of
time’s arrow that links the macrostate directly to the micro-dynamics. Surprisingly,
4This may cast some doubt on what Wigner (1960) calls the “unreasaonable effectiveness of
mathematics in the natural sciences.”
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far from making the world fuzzy or indeterminate, quantum theory can restore
exactness in the nomological structure of the world. (§4 may be skipped by people
whose main interests lie outside philosophy of physics.)
2 Exactness and Vagueness of the Fundamental Laws
In this section, I propose an account of exactness and vagueness of the fundamental
laws.
2.1 What They Are
First, I review some features of vagueness in ordinary language predicates. They
have analogues in fundamental nomic vagueness. The paradigmatically vague
predicates include ones such as “bald,” “tall,” “red,” “child,” and “heap.” Following
Keefe and Smith (1996), I summarize their common features:
(Borderline) Vague predicates have borderline cases.
To be a borderline case is to be some object or state of affairs for which the predicates
do not determinately apply. John with exactly 5250 hairs on his head is a borderline
case of “bald.”
(No Sharp Boundary) Vague predicates do not have well-defined extensions.
A precise extension of “bald” and a precise extension of “not bald” would pick out
a precise boundary between the two. Suppose anyone with 6000 or more hairs
is not bald and anyone with fewer than 6000 hairs is bald. Then John would fall
under the extension of “bald.” Alex with exactly 6000 hairs would fall under the
extension of “not bald,” but if Alex loses just one more hair she would fall out of
“not bald” and fall into “bald.” (We can add a parenthetical qualifier ‘apparently’ to
accommodate views such as epistemicism according to which vague predicates do
have well-defined extensions but we don’t know what they are.)
(Sorites) Vague predicates are susceptible to sorites paradoxes.
It is easy to generate sorites paradoxes on vague predicates. For example, we can
start from a case that is determinately bald (having no hair) and proceed to add
one hair at a time, argue that at no point can adding one hair make the difference
between “bald” and “not bald,” and come to the absurd conclusion that no number
of hairs will make one non-bald.
(Higher-order Vagueness) Vague predicates come with higher-order vagueness.
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Whenever there are borderline cases, there are borderline borderline cases, and
borderline borderline borderline cases. This is known as the phenomenon of higher-
order vagueness. If it is indeterminate where to draw the line between “bald” and
“not bald,” plausibly it is indeterminate where to draw the line between “bald” and
“borderline bald,” and between “not bald” and “borderline not bald,” and so on. In
other words, it seems inappropriate to draw a sharp line at any level. This is part of
the genuine fuzziness we are interested in below.
Higher-order vagueness is a challenge to any formal and precise model of
vagueness. Even on degree-theoretic accounts of vagueness, there will be an exact
boundary between maximal determinateness and less-than-maximal determinateness
and exact boundaries around any determinate degree of vagueness, which seems
unfaithful to the phenomena of higher-order vagueness (Keefe and Smith 1996, pp.
46-47). The same point applies to imprecise probabilities that are treated in terms
of set-valued measures. After all, a set of probability measures is still too precise
to faithfully represent the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness.5 Even some
defenders of the degree-theoretic accounts acknowledge that the numbers used to
model vagueness should be taken instrumentally and not realistically. For example,
Edgington (1996) suggests that “[the] numbers serve a purpose as a theoretical tool,
even if there is no perfect mapping between them and the phenomena” (p.297).
Can higher-order vagueness be mathematically expressed in a completely faithful
way (with a perfect mapping between the mathematical representation and the
phenomena)? I doubt it, but I do not have an impossibility proof (although Sainsbury
(1990) gives compelling arguments that higher-order vagueness cannot be faithfully
described set-theoretically).6 I shall assume that it cannot be. If my assumption
is incorrect, then this paper can be seen as another reason to look for a perfect
mathematical representation.
We might expect that, at the fundamental level of reality, everything is perfectly
exact. In particular, we might expect that there is no vagueness in the fundamental
physical ontology of the world (the fundamental physical objects and their properties)
or in the fundamental nomological structure of the world (the fundamental laws).
How should we understand the exactness of paradigm fundamental laws of
nature? Let us start with the familiar case of Newtonian mechanics with Newtonian
gravitation. The theory can be formulated as a set of differential equations that admit
a determinate set of solutions. Those solutions will specify all and only the possible
histories compatible with Newtonian equations (F = ma and F = Gm1m2/r2); each
solution represents a nomologically possible world of the theory.
Consider the projectile motion illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that the projectile
5See Rinard (2017) for insightful arguments against using set-valued probabilities to model
imprecise probabilities (IP). Rinard’s argument is relevant to our discussion of PH. Even if we use a
probability distribution or a set of probability distributions concentrated on some macrostate, it is
still too precise. To genuinely respect higher-order vagueness, we can replace a set of probability
distribution with a vague “collection” of probability distributions, where some distributions will be
borderline members of the “collection.” Membership turns out to be vague.
6 Williamson (1994) §4.12 further argues that higher-order vagueness is not faithfully modeled by
many-valued logics (and degree-theoretic approaches to truth).
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Figure 1: The motion of a projectile under Newtonian mechanics. Picture by Zátonyi
Sándor, (ifj.) Fizped, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>,
via Wikimedia Commons.
has unit mass m and the gravitational acceleration is g (we simplify the example
by ignoring the rest of the world). We can specify the history of the projectile with
the initial height, initial velocity, maximum height, and distance traveled. There
is a determinate set of histories compatible with Newtonian equations. For any
history of the projectile, it is either determinately compatible with the equations or
determinately incompatible with the equations. And the same is true when we fully
describe the example by accounting for all the massive bodies in the world.
In terms of possible worlds (or models, if one dislikes possible worlds): if W
represents the space of all possible worlds, then Newtonian mechanics corresponds
to a proper subset in W that has a determinate boundary, where the boundary is not
in spacetime but in modal space. Let us call that subset the domain of Newtonian
mechanics; it represents the nomological possibilities according to Newtonian
mechanics. For any possible world w ∈ W, either w is contained in the domain of
Newtonian mechanics or it is not. For example, in Figure 2, w1 is inside but w2 is
outside the set of worlds delineated by Newtonian mechanics. In other words, w1 is
nomologically possible while w2 is nomologically impossible if Newtonian laws are
true and fundamental. This suggests that we can capture an aspect of fundamental
nomic exactness in terms of domain exactness:
Domain Exactness A fundamental law L is domain-exact if and only if, (a) for any
world w ∈ W, there is a determinate fact about whether w is contained inside
L’s domain of worlds, i.e. L’s domain has no borderline worlds, (b) L’s domain,
which may also be called L’s extension, forms a set of worlds, (c) L’s domain
is not susceptible to sorites paradoxes, and (d) L’s domain has no borderline
borderline worlds, no borderline borderline borderline worlds, and so on.
In contrast, a domain-vague law has none of (a)–(d). Intuitively, a domain-vague
law has a vague boundary in the following sense. In Figure 2, a domain-vague law
is pictured by a “collection” of worlds with a fuzzy boundary. Just as a cloud does
not have a clear starting point or a clear end point, the fuzzy “collection” of worlds










Figure 2: An exact fundamental law and a vague fundamental law represented in
modal space.
are clearly incompatible with the law. To borrow the words of Sainsbury (1990), a
domain-vague law classifies worlds “without setting boundaries” in modal space.
For example, w3 is clearly contained inside the domain of the vague law, since it is so
far away from the fuzzy boundary; but w4 is not clearly contained inside the domain
of the vague law, and neither is it clearly outside; w2 is clearly outside the domain.
More precisely, I propose that we understand domain vagueness as the opposite of
domain exactness:
Domain Vagueness A fundamental law L is domain-vague if and only if L meets
all four conditions below.
(a’) L has borderline worlds that are not determinately compatible with it. For some
world w ∈ W, there fails to be a determinate fact about whether w is contained
inside L’s domain of worlds.
(b’) L lacks a well-defined extension in terms of a set of models or a set of nomological
possibilities. Nomological necessities and possibilities turn out to be vague.
(c’) L is susceptible to sorites paradoxes. We can start from a world that is
determinately lawful, proceed to gradually make small changes to the world
along some relevant dimension, and eventually arrive at a world that is
determinately unlawful. But no particular small change makes the difference
between lawful and unlawful.
(d’) L possesses higher-order domain-vagueness. Whenever there are borderline
lawful worlds, there are borderline borderline lawful worlds, and so on. It
seems inappropriate to draw a sharp line anywhere. This reflects the genuine
fuzziness of domain vagueness.
Thus, domain vagueness has features similar to those of ordinary-language vagueness.
What if L has some but not all of (a’)–(d’)? For example, a law may have a domain
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where it is indeterminate whether some world w is contained in it, but its domain
does not have higher-order vagueness or sorites-susceptibility. If such a case exists,
it may be a case of indeterminacy, but I do not characterize it as vagueness.7 At
any rate, domain exactness and domain vagueness capture the kind of fundamental
nomic exactness and fundamental nomic vagueness we care about in this paper.8
We will use them to understand some case studies in the following sections. In §3,
we show that PH, if it is true and if it can be regarded as a fundamental law, is an
instance of a vague fundamental law of nature. It exemplifies domain vagueness:
the “collection” of worlds compatible with PH does not have a sharp boundary.
2.2 What They Are Not
To better understand fundamental nomic exactness and fundamental nomic vague-
ness, it would be helpful to say what they are not. Importantly, they are not about
the absence or the presence of approximations. As pictured in Figure 2, the worlds
that make up the domain of fundamental laws are entire possible worlds (conceived
as complete world histories, or histories of the universe). Approximations arise
when we apply fundamental laws to partial world histories, such as histories of some
subsystems of the universe. In many subsystems, they are governed by effective
laws—laws that are only approximately true about certain kinds of subsystems.
When a subsystem is not completely isolated from its environment (the rest of the
universe), there may be forces between objects in the subsystem and objects in the
environment that are negligibly small but nonzero. In that case, we can, for all
practical purposes, treat the subsystem as if it were a closed system and still apply
the fundamental laws to the subsystem, but with the understanding that such laws
are only approximately true. On my view, that is not fundamental nomic vagueness.
In that case, the fundamental laws are determinately false about the subsystem.
2.3 Laws of Nature
So far we have focused on exactness and vagueness of fundamental laws. The
issue can also come up in non-fundamental scientific theories, which can employ
vague non-fundamental laws. For example, in so far as biology has laws, they may
invoke vague predicates such as “cell,” “organism,” and “species.” The focus and
the novelty of this paper lies in developing (in §2.1) a general account of nomic
vagueness of fundamental laws of nature and arguing (in §3) that PH is a realistic
case of such nomic vagueness. Vagueness in the fundamental laws is surprising
and deserves special attention from metaphysicians and philosophers of science. If
some vague fundamental laws are part of the complete theory of the physical world,
and if such vagueness is not fully mathematically expressible, then the complete
7 In this paper, by ‘a fundamental law fails to be exact,’ I mean it satisfies all of (a’)–(d’). It is
plausible that (a’) implies (b’), (c’), and arguably (d’). However, I do not argue for that here.
8There is another kind of fundamental nomic vagueness that results from vague objective
probabilities or typicalities. See Goldstein (2012). Fenton-Glynn (2019) offers an account of imprecise
(but not vague) chances in the best-system theory.
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theory cannot be faithfully written in the language of mathematics. Nonetheless,
the discussion may also provide a model for understanding nomic vagueness at the
non-fundamental levels, which I leave for future work.
Let me say more about the notion of fundamental laws employed in this paper9:
Fundamental Laws For any world w, fundamental laws of nature in w are the non-
mathematical axioms (basic postulates) of the complete fundamental physical
theory of w.10
Examples of physical theories include classical mechanics and quantum mechanics.11
For a physical theory to be complete in world w, it needs to entail all the important
regularities in w, including those described by non-fundamental laws (such as laws of
chemistry, biology, and so on). For a physical theory to be fundamental in w, it cannot
be derived from another non-equivalent physical theory that is true in w.12 Hence, in
a quantum world, classical mechanics is not a fundamental theory, because it can
be derived from quantum mechanics (via approximations in some limit). However,
in a classical world, classical mechanics is a fundamental theory because quantum
mechanics is not true in such a world. In §3.1, I suggest that in a time-asymmetric
classical world, classical mechanics by itself is not complete because it fails to account
for the time asymmetries, which is an important class of regularities (and the same
applies to a time-asymmetric quantum world). A solution is to add PH to the
micro-dynamical equations to complete the fundamental theory. Fundamental laws
have an elite status—they are axiomatic. In terms of modality, since the axioms are
nomologically necessary, the derived theorems will also have nomological necessity.
The derivation may be complicated due to mathematical complexities. The physical
theory can employ some mathematics, but the mathematical axioms are not laws of
nature. Hence, the fundamental laws of nature are the non-mathematical axioms.
Laws in w are either fundamental or non-fundamental in w. I require non-
fundamental laws in w be derivable13 from fundamental laws in w. But not all
deductive consequences of fundamental laws are laws, for otherwise we could
trivialize the notion of laws by using disjunction introduction. Some deductive
9Similar conceptions can be found in the writings of physicists such as Weinberg (1992) and
Hawking (2008) as well as philosophers of physics Albert (2000, 2015) and Loewer (2012, 2020a). This
conception of laws is related to reductionism of non-fundamental sciences to physics. On reductionism
vs. autonomy of “special sciences,” see for example Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and Fodor
(1974). On my conception, even though non-fundamental laws are derivable from fundamental laws,
non-fundamental laws are not redundant; they play important roles in scientific explanations at
non-fundamental levels. This conception might not contradict the viewpoint of Fodor (1974).
10We also expect the complete fundamental theory to be simple, consistent, and unified.
11The true theory of the world is not yet discovered. But we have some hints of what it might look
like, based on current theories.
12The qualifier “non-equivalent” is added so that merely having an equivalent reformulation does
not disqualify a theory from being fundamental. Without the qualification, if T and T′ are two
equivalent physical theories that are mutually derivable, then neither T nor T′ can be fundamental.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I make this clear.
13The relevant derivations may also involve approximations and idealizations. Again, we set these
issues aside as it does not impact the argument in §3.
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consequences will be more important than others because they support counterfac-
tuals and are extraordinarily useful and simple. Identifying the sufficient conditions
for laws is an important project, but I do not pursue it here. Instead, I suggest a
necessary condition for a law to be non-fundamental in w:
Necessary Condition for Non-Fundamental Laws In any world w, if a law of na-
ture is a non-fundamental law in w, then it can be (non-trivially) derived from
the fundamental laws in w.
Consequently, a law that cannot be so (non-trivially) derived in w is a fundamental
law in w. An example of a non-fundamental law in our world is the ideal gas law
PV = nRT that can be derived from the micro-physics. Not all non-fundamental laws
have been successfully derived from the fundamental axioms in physics, but what
matters is that they can be.
The above conception is somewhat neutral about the metaphysics of lawhood.
Let me say more about the metaphysical commitments. With Hicks and Schaffer
(2017), I do not insist on Lewis (1983)’s strict criterion that fundamental laws are
stated exclusively with predicates that correspond to perfectly natural properties.14
When formulating fundamental laws, scientists should be free to invoke derived
properties as long as they are scientifically useful. In fact, Lewis’s own analysis of
probabilistic laws allows objective probability to appear in the axioms of the best system
yet objective probability is not perfectly natural (and neither is it categorical).15 For
the Humean best-system framework, I suggest we replace the strict criterion with
this one: the best system optimally balances simplicity, informativeness, fit, and
degree of naturalness of the properties invoked by the axioms.16 The revision arguably
still handles the trivialization problem that motivates the strict criterion.17 In so
far as derived properties are instantiated by fundamental objects, there is nothing
metaphysically spooky. For example, even though acceleration is a derived property
(from positions) in Newtonian mechanics, F = ma can delineate what is nomologically
possible. Similarly, entropy is a derived property (from volume in phase space), and
a low-entropy initial condition can also constrain the nomological possibilities. As
such, fundamental laws involving derived properties can still describe (or govern)
the behavior of fundamental objects. Nevertheless, in the cases of entropy and
acceleration, unlike the property of being a tiger, the derived properties are easily
re-expressible in terms of fundamental properties and the re-expressed laws can still
be simple. Hence, sometimes even the strict criterion can be satisfied (see §3.2).
14See Sider (2011) for a defense and expansion of Lewis’s criterion.
15Thanks to Chris Dorst for discussion here.
16For similar suggestions see Hicks and Schaffer (2017), Fenton-Glynn (2019), and Sánchez (2020).
It would certainly be useful to give a full account on how to calculate the degree of naturalness, but I
do not pursue it here.
17Briefly, the trivialization problem is this (Lewis 1983, p.367): without some constraint of natu-
ralness, the best system can be just the simple and maximally informative sentence ∀xFx where F
applies to all and only actual objects. The system entails all actual truths and regularities. That result,
on Lewis’s account, means all regularities are laws, which trivializes the distinction between laws
and non-laws. Lewis appeals to perfect naturalness to block the problem, but degree of naturalness
also suffices (Hicks and Schaffer 2017).
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Moreover, with Callender (2004) and pace Lewis (1983), I do not require laws to
concern exclusively regularities. Certain boundary conditions of the universe, such
as PH, are candidate axioms of the Lewisian best system. On Humeanism, why
automatically disqualify PH, which seems to be an axiom of the actual best system of
our world, from being a fundamental law?18 I see no compelling reason. There are
many other versions of Humeanism, such as those found in Cohen and Callender
(2009) and Loewer (2020b). For concreteness, when I discuss Humeanism, I focus on
this particularly interesting version of the non-governing conception of laws:
Reformed Humeanism The fundamental laws are the (non-mathematical) axioms of
the best system that summarizes the mosaic and optimally balances simplicity,
informativeness, fit, and degree of naturalness of the properties invoked. The
best system supervenes on the mosaic.19
Regarding the governing conception of laws, with Maudlin (2007), I think the
best versions are ones where laws are interpreted as ontological primitives; they are
not to be analyzed further in terms of universals, essences, powers, dispositions,
and the like. However, pace Maudlin, I do not posit the direction of time as a
fundamental feature of the universe and do not consider temporal production as
central to the notion of governing. Consequently, for anti-Humeanism, I would not
restrict fundamental laws to dynamical laws of temporal evolution. In particular,
boundary conditions can be fundamental laws. A boundary condition such as PH
can govern the world by constraining the nomological possibilities, thereby limiting
the range of behavior of fundamental objects. Hence, I am particularly interested in
a minimal governing conception of laws:
Minimal Primitivism Fundamental laws of nature are the (non-mathematical) fun-
damental facts that govern the behavior of fundamental objects; there is no
restriction on the forms of the fundamental laws.
The theoretical virtues invoked by the reformed Humean are still useful for the
minimal primitivist:
Epistemic Guides Even though theoretical virtues such as simplicity, informative-
ness, fit, and degree of naturalness are not metaphysically constitutive of
fundamental laws, they are good epistemic guides for discovering them.
Reformed Humeanism and minimal primitivism are two well-motivated metaphysi-
cal views about laws. However, they are not accepted by everyone. I do not have the
space to defend them in detail, but I think they capture two important metaphysical
conceptions of lawhood in the literature. In §3.1, I show that both support the
proposal that PH is a fundamental law.
18Some may worry that this dissolves the distinction between boundary conditions and laws.
However, not all boundary conditions have the required balance of optimally contributing to simplicity,
informativeness, fit, and degree of naturalness.
19Here I set aside the issue whether the Humean mosaic contains only categorical and “point-sized”
facts.
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2.4 Vagueness in the World?
Fundamental laws of nature are objective features of the physical world. Thus,
fundamental nomic vagueness appears to be “worldly.” However, fundamental
nomic vagueness differs from standard cases of worldly or ontic vagueness that
concern the vague identity, spatio-temporal boundaries, and parts of material objects
(such as cats, clouds, mountains, and tables).20 That is because fundamental laws of
nature are not material objects and do not have boundaries or parts in spacetime.
Moreover, fundamental nomic vagueness is not modeled by Barnes’s (2010) theory,
one of the most developed theories of ontic vagueness to date. Nevertheless, if
fundamental laws are fundamental facts of the world, then their vagueness can be
seen as metaphysical. Hence, there is conceptual room for a more liberal conception
of ontic vagueness that includes fundamental nomic vagueness.
Standard cases of ontic vagueness are material objects with vague boundaries
or parts in spacetime.21 For concreteness, consider Tom the cat. Tom is composed
of many molecules, but some are borderline parts of Tom (and some are borderline
borderline parts of Tom, and so on). Moreover, there are many exact groupings of
the molecules, called p-cats. Which p-cat is identical to Tom? It may be vague. We
can also run sorites argument and remove molecules one at a time from Tom. As a
first approximation, the picture suggested by the focus on standard cases seems to
be this22:
V1 There is ontic vagueness if and only if there is some material object (or objects)
and some property (or relation) of material objects such that it is vague whether
the object (or objects) has the property (or relation).23
On V1, if Tom is an actual vague material object, then there is ontic vagueness. In
contrast, Keefe and Smith (1996) suggest that vagueness of macroscopic objects such
as Tom is “merely superficial” (p.56). Facts about Tom supervene on the material
objects and their properties at the “base level” (the metaphysically fundamental
level), if such a level exists. Only vagueness at the fundamental level qualifies
for “non-superficial” ontic vagueness. They seem to hold onto the following view
(although they do not mention relations):
20For an overview of ontic vagueness, see Sorensen (2018) §8, Keefe and Smith (1996), Williams
(2008), and the references therein.
21See Tye (1990), as well as related discussions about ‘the problem of the many’ in Geach (1980) and
Unger (1980). See Hawley (2001) for a discussion about vagueness in temporal persistence.
22Some of the theorists such as Parsons and Woodruff (1995) and Barnes (2010) mention only
indeterminacy in their official statements even though their target is ontic vagueness. It does not
matter to my arguments below. If such indeterminacy does not come with other features of the
target sense of vagueness (sorites-susceptibilty, higher-order vagueness, etc), then fundamental nomic
vagueness is not modeled by their theories.
23Parsons and Woodruff (1995) seem to hold such a view, even though their emphasis is on the
states of affairs about material objects having properties or relations. For them, the objects are those
things that make up the world, and the relations include the identity relation, which is the focus of
their analysis.
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V2 There is ontic vagueness if and only if there is some fundamental material object
(or objects) and some fundamental property (or relation) such that it is vague
whether the object (or objects) has the property (or relation).
V2 only looks at the fundamental material objects (such as fundamental particles)
and their fundamental properties and relations (such as mass, charge, and spatio-
temporal relations). Burgess (1990) challenges V2 and defends the idea in V1 that the
existence of vague macroscopic objects also qualifies for ontic vagueness, because
the idea allows one to “say familiar things about the nature of concrete physical
reality” (p.286) and to respect the task of metaphysics to “describe each layer [of the
multi-layered reality] and the relationships between them” (p.283). However, neither
V1 nor V2 recognizes fundamental nomic vagueness as a version of ontic vagueness.
To model ontic vagueness, Barnes (2010) proposes the following:
V3 There is ontic vagueness if and only if every possible world is exact but it is
vague which world is the actualized world.24
Barnes’s proposal is motivated by a desire to preserve classical logical principles
such as bivalence and excluded middle. It is one of the most developed theories
of ontic vagueness to date. Again, fundamental nomic vagueness does not imply
ontic vagueness in the sense of V3, as a fundamental law (such as PH) may be vague
without it being vague which possible world is actualized. What fundamental nomic
vagueness violates is this principle:
V4 It is vague which worlds are nomologically possible.25
Even so, a vague fundamental law does not contradict this:
V5 It is vague which worlds are metaphysically possible.
On a more liberal conception of ontic vagueness, according to which validating V4
suffices for there being ontic vagueness, fundamental nomic vagueness would then
count as ontic vagueness. On minimal primitivism, and on any view where funda-
mental laws and facts about nomologically possibilities are among the fundamental
facts, validating V4 entails violating this:
Fundamental Exactness All the fundamental facts of the world are exact.
If the idea about ontic vagueness is simply vagueness in the fundamental facts,
then it seems that we should adopt the more liberal conception that leaves room for
fundamental nomic vagueness to count as ontic vagueness. However, if the idea is
24This relies on an ersatz modal theory where there is exactly one actual world, possible worlds are
ersatz objects, and one of them is actualized. See Barnes (2010) pp.613-621.
25There is an interesting similarity between fundamental nomic vagueness and standard cases
of ontic vagueness of material objects. While Tom has a fuzzy boundary in spacetime, a vague
fundamental law (see Figure 2) has a fuzzy boundary in modal space.
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more restrictive along the lines of V1–V3, then fundamental nomic vagueness does
not count.
Let me say more about the connection between fundamental nomic vagueness
and Fundamental Exactness. It is natural to wonder whether fundamental nomic
vagueness would favor reformed Humeanism over minimal primitivism, since the
Humean mosaic can be perfectly exact even when some fundamental laws are vague.
It depends on whether it is a vice of a theory to lose Fundamental Exactness when it
does not entail ontic vagueness in the more restrictive sense. I suspect the answer
is not straightforward, as there are other factors to consider. In §3.3, I suggest that
fundamental nomic vagueness is a relevant desideratum in theory-choice but it
should be used carefully when other things are equal.
On minimal primitivism, if the epistemic guides point us to a theory with a
vague fundamental axiom, then we have good reasons to accept some fundamental
nomic vagueness. However, since the epistemic guides are defeasible and fallible,
they do not guarantee finding the true fundamental laws. Some might take this as
a reason to adopt an epistemic view of fundamental nomic vagueness, according
to which there is an exact boundary of nomological possibilities but it is hidden
from us. However, the minimal primitivist should resist that urge, as she has good
reasons to trust the epistemic guides as truth-conducive, assuming the world is
induction-friendly. Hence, if she has good reasons to take the vague postulate as a
fundamental law, then she should take that as evidence that there are indeterminate
facts about nomological possibilities even if that violates Fundamental Exactness.
From an empiricist perspective, metaphysical assumptions are revisable in light of
empirical evidence.
On reformed Humeanism, if the best system includes a vague axiom, then we have
to accept some fundamental nomic vagueness. After all, on reformed Humeanism,
being part of the best axiomatization is constitutive of being a fundamental law.
However, fundamental nomic vagueness does not entail a violation of fundamental
exactness, as fundamental laws are not among the fundamental facts of reformed
Humeanism. Even if the reformed Humean has to accept some fundamental nomic
vagueness, she may have multiple ways to understand its nature. I leave that to
future work.
2.5 Vagueness in the Quantum Measurement Axioms?
No physical theory has inspired more discussions about indeterminacy than quantum
theory. It has been argued that ontic vagueness in a strict sense is a feature implied by
quantum theory (see, for example, Lowe (1994), French and Krause (2003)). However,
we now have precise formulations of quantum mechanics such as Bohm’s theory,
GRW spontaneous collapse theory, and Everett’s theory (see Myrvold (2017) for
a review). In those theories, there is no vagueness in the fundamental material
ontology or fundamental dynamics (satisfying V1–V4). The world can be described
as a universal quantum state evolving deterministically (or stochastically) and in
some cases guiding and determining the trajectories of material objects, all of which
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are exact.
However, textbook versions of quantum mechanics seems to offer a genuine case
of fundamental nomic vagueness. We focus on the dynamical laws.26 Textbook
versions suggest that quantum theory contains two kinds of laws: one linear, smooth,
and deterministic evolution of the wave function (the Schrödinger equation), and
the other stochastic jump of the wave function triggered by measurements of some
system (collapse postulates). However, it is unclear what counts as a measurement,
and hence it is unclear when the two dynamical laws apply. For any precise definition
we propose, say in terms of the size of the system, we can imagine a slightly smaller
or a slightly larger size that could also work. For any precise boundary between
the measured system and the measuring apparatus, we can imagine a somewhat
different line. So there seems to be no principled way to draw the boundary between
the system and the apparatus and hence no principled definition of when to apply
the two laws.
Bell (1990) speaks out against such vagueness in the fundamental axioms of
quantum mechanics:
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ‘mea-
surer’? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands
of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or
did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system...with
a Ph.D.?....The first charge against ‘measurement’, in the fundamental
axioms of quantum mechanics, is that it anchors there the shifty split of
the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. (p.34)
Bell’s first objection is that textbook quantum mechanics is too vague. Even supposing
terms such as ‘measurement’ have determinate cases, it is hard to imagine there be
a sharp split between systems that are measurers and systems that are measured.
Hence, there will be histories of the wave function that count as borderline possible.
However, the real issue that troubles Bell is the disunity suggested by the theory:
the world is (vaguely) split into two parts, one classical and one quantum. If we
are allowed to apply the theory to only part of the world, then it is “to betray the
great enterprise” (p.34) of understanding the world in a unified way. The “shifty
split” shows that the division is not a principled one. So it seems to me, in this case,
fundamental nomic vagueness is a symptom that points us to the deeper problem
that the theory is disunified. I return to this issue in §3.3.
As a historical matter, the vagueness issue has been resolved in precise formula-
tions of quantum mechanics of Bohm, GRW, and Everett, making quantum mechanics
less relevant as a serious case for ontic vagueness or fundamental nomic vagueness.
These theories not only resolve the vagueness issue, but they are also better physical
theories. They provide deeper, more unified, and observer-independent explanations
about ‘quantum measurements.’ On those theories, measurement is not a sui generis
process that has special powers in the physical world, and collapse is not a process
26For the related issue of “quantum metaphysical indeterminacy” that arises from considerations
of realism about quantum observables, see Calosi and Wilson (2019) and the references therein.
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that occurs only when an observer is present. Rather, they are treated as any other
process that obeys the same set of physical laws. They uphold the physicalist
aspiration that observers are just part of nature and nothing special. Hence, even
setting aside the issue of vagueness, there are reasons not to take textbook quantum
axioms as candidate fundamental laws. In order to find a more realistic case of
fundamental nomic vagueness, we must look elsewhere.
3 A Case Study of Fundamental Nomic Vagueness: The Past Hy-
pothesis
In this section, I provide a more realistic case of fundamental nomic vagueness that
arises from considerations of the arrow of time.
3.1 Temporal Asymmetries and the Past Hypothesis
In a world governed by (essentially) time-symmetric dynamical laws such as classical
mechanical equations, quantum mechanical equations, or relativistic equations, it
is plausible to think that the time-asymmetric nomological regularities (such as the
tendency for entropy to increase and not decrease) cannot be derived from dynamical
laws alone.
What else should be added? An influential proposal suggests we postulate a
special initial condition: the universe was initially in a low-entropy macrostate,
one with a high degree of order. This is now called the Past Hypothesis (PH).27
Assuming PH and an accompanying Statistical Postulate (SP) of a uniform probability
distribution over possible microstates compatible with the low-entropy macrostate,
most likely the universe’s entropy increases towards the future and decreases
towards the past. The presence of PH, and the absence of a corresponding low-
entropy hypothesis at the other end of time, explains the wide-spread temporal
asymmetry. There are several versions of PH, of varying strengths, which we discuss
in §3.2 and §3.3. What is important for my purpose in this section is that PH narrows
down the choices of the initial microstate of the universe (a maximally fine-grained
description of its physical state): they have to be compatible with some special
macrostates (coarse-grained descriptions of the physical state) with low entropy.
To qualify as a serious candidate for fundamental nomic vagueness, PH needs to
be considered as a candidate for a fundamental law of nature. Its nomic status has
been taken seriously in the literature. For example, Feynman (2017)[1965] writes:
Therefore I think it is necessary to add to the physical laws the
hypothesis that in the past the universe was more ordered, in the technical
27PH was originally proposed in Boltzmann (1964)[1898]§89 (though Boltzmann ultimately seems
to favor what may be called the Fluctuation Hypothesis) and discussed in Feynman (2017)[1965]§5. A
geometric version was proposed by Penrose (1979). For recent discussions, see Albert (2000), Loewer
(2020a), Callender (2011), North (2011), Lebowitz (2008), Goldstein (2001), and Goldstein et al. (2020).
For critical discussions, see Earman (2006).
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sense, than it is today—I think this is the additional statement that is
needed to make sense, and to make an understanding of the irreversibility.
Making a similar point, Goldstein et al. (2020) write:
The past hypothesis is the one crucial assumption we make in addition
to the dynamical laws of classical mechanics. The past hypothesis may
well have the status of a law of physics—not a dynamical law but a
law selecting a set of admissible histories among the solutions of the
dynamical laws.
See also Albert (2000), Callender (2004), and Loewer (2007).
I think we have good reasons, both scientific and philosophical, to accept that (1)
PH is a law, and (2) PH is a fundamental law. Here is another place where there is
room for reasonable disagreements. Although I find the reasons compelling, others
might not. They might resist (1) and (2) by rejecting my assumptions. Ultimately,
my main conclusions are conditional: (A) if one accepts my conception of laws of
nature, then PH is a fundamental law, and (B) if PH is a fundamental law, then
there is fundamental nomic vagueness. If someone wants to avoid committing
to fundamental nomic vagueness, they might see the arguments in this paper as
reasons to resist the idea that PH is a fundamental law or the conception of laws that
motivates the idea.
I argue for (B) in §3.2-3.3. For the remainder of this subsection, I argue for (A).
I review three reasons in favor of (1) that PH is a law. First, the Second Law of
Thermodynamics is a non-fundamental law that is derivable from PH and dynamical
laws. The Second Law is a statistical law: typically, most isolated subsystems increase
in entropy towards the future and decrease in entropy towards the past. It can
admit exceptions, which are nomologically possible but unlikely (assuming SP). The
Second Law is a statistical law because it satisfies many desiderata for lawhood. For
example, it is projectable and supports a wide range of counterfactuals. (Even if we
were on Mars, most isolated ice cubes in the cup would most likely be larger in the
past and smaller in the future. Even if there were Martians, they would most likely
not be able to regularly separate milk and coffee with a few casual swirls of a spoon
(Carroll 2010).) Hence, the Second Law has nomological necessity. Now, if the PH is
nomologically contingent, the Second Law will also be nomologically contingent
(since the Second Law is partly derived from PH). Hence, PH is nomologically
necessary. Second, the counterfactual arrow of time depends on nomic facts. Treating
PH as a law of nature provides a good explanation for the counterfactual arrow:
PH severely constrains the nomic possibility space such that typical (in the sense
made precise by SP) histories exemplify counterfactual dependence in one temporal
direction only. Lewis (1979)’s explanation for the counterfactual arrow is not sufficient
as shown by Elga (2001). As Loewer (2007) points out, to fix it we need to include PH
as a law. Third, there is an abundance of physical records about the past but no such
records about the future. Having PH as a law explains that. It also explains why
such an asymmetry is not accidental or extremely unlikely. Assuming that PH is a
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law and SP underwrites objective probabilities, it is indeed overwhelmingly likely
that our past was in a lower entropy state and not a higher entropy state like our
future, thus blocking the reversibility paradox and the skeptical catastrophe (Albert
(2000) §4).
Given the conception of fundamental laws discussed in §2.3, there are good
reasons in favor of (2) that PH is a fundamental law. A law is a fundamental law in
w if it is not derivable from other fundamental laws in w. PH is not derivable from
standard fundamental laws we postulate in our world, because they are compatible
with both PH and its negation. For example, just like Newtonian mechanics,
quantum mechanics is compatible with a low-entropy initial macrostate and with
a high-entropy one.28 Hence, if PH is a law in our world, and in so far as we have
good reasons to think that the true physical theory has features similar to current
ones, then we have good reasons to think that PH is a fundamental law in our
world. That, I maintain, is a reasonable verdict. After all, if PH is not derivable from
other fundamental laws, it will be axiomatic in the fundamental physical theory,
on a par with other fundamental laws. If PH is a non-fundamental law, how can
it have an axiomatic status? If it plays the same role as other fundamental laws
as axiomatic constraints on the nomological possibilities, has PH not earned the
elite status? Moreover, if one is a reformed Humean about laws of nature, one
has a direct argument for the fundamental nomological status of PH. The system
containing PH and SP as axioms is way more informative than the system without
them and is only slightly more complex (cf: Callender (2004) and Loewer (2012)).
Similar considerations hold for minimal primitivism, where the best system is used
as our best epistemic guide to find the fundamental “governing” laws. The set of
fundamental axioms including PH, SP, and fundamental dynamical laws has been
named the Mentaculus by Loewer (2007) and Albert (2015). See Demarest (2019) and
Chen (2020a,b) for further developments of the Mentaculus.
One could raise two objections on metaphysical grounds. First, PH concerns
the boundary condition of the universe and is not a dynamical law. As such, it is
different from other candidate fundamental laws such as the Schrödinger equation.
However, on my view, that is not a relevant difference. As discussed in §2.3, being
non-dynamical does not automatically disqualify PH from being a fundamental
law. Second, PH concerns metaphysically non-elite properties such as entropy
which should not appear in a fundamental law. However, from the perspective
of reformed Humeanism and minimal primitivism, it is not absolute eliteness that
matters but relative eliteness. As long as entropy is relatively elite (relatively natural
and fundamental), it can appear in the reformed Humean best system and the
minimal primitivist’s fundamental laws. Moreover, entropy can be fairly easily
28What about deriving PH from some non-standard theories? There is progress on this front, but
success is not guaranteed. For example, Carroll and Chen (2004) developed a multiverse model
with unbounded entropy in which “baby universes” are spontaneously created in low-entropy
states. In such a model, PH is not a fundamental postulate but a local initial condition induced
by time-symmetric dynamical laws that are more fundamental. However, although theoretically
possible, it is far from clear whether the actual dynamical laws produce such “baby universes” and
produce them in sufficiently low-entropy states.
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re-expressed in terms of fundamental properties. I discuss that in §3.2.
These considerations provide good reasons to think that, conditionalized on
the assumptions, we should interpret PH as a fundamental law in our world. If
one is not willing to call PH a fundamental law, one may still accept that, given its
nomological necessity and underivability from other fundamental laws, PH enjoys
an axiomatic status in the fundamental physical theory. As such, its vagueness has
the same ramifications for nomic modalities and the mathematical expressibility of
the fundamental theory.
3.2 Vagueness of the Weak Past Hypothesis
Hence, we have good reasons to think that there is fundamental nomic vagueness
in our world if PH is vague. Is PH vague? To begin, let us consider the following
version of PH that is sometimes proposed:
Super Weak Past Hypothesis (SWPH) At one temporal boundary of space-time,
the universe has very low entropy.
SWPH is obviously vague. How low is low? The collection of worlds with “low-
entropy” initial conditions has fuzzy boundaries in the space of possible worlds.
Hence, if SWPH were a fundamental law, then we would have nomic (domain)
vagueness.
However, SWPH may not be detailed enough to explain all the temporal asym-
metries. For example, in order to explain the temporal asymmetries of records,
intervention, and knowledge, Albert (2000) and Loewer (2020a) suggest that we need
a more specific condition that narrows down the initial microstates to a particular
macrostate. One way to specify the macrostate invokes exact numeral values for
the macroscopic variables of the early universe. Let S0,T0,V0,D0 represent the exact
values (or exact distributions) of (low) entropy, (high) temperature, (small) volume,
and (roughly uniform) density distribution of the initial state. Consider the following
version of PH:
Weak Past Hypothesis (WPH) At one temporal boundary of space-time, the uni-
verse is in a particular macrostate M0, specified by the macroscopic variables
S0,T0,V0, and D0.
WPH is a stronger version of PH than SWPH. By picking out a particular (low-
entropy) macrostate M0 from many macrostates, WPH more severely constrains the
initial state of the universe. WPH is also more precise than SWPH. (Some may even
complain that the WPH is too strong and too precise.) Unfortunately, WPH is still
vague. The collection of worlds compatible with WPH has fuzzy boundaries. If
WPH were a fundamental law, then we would still have nomic (domain) vagueness:
there are some worlds whose initial conditions are borderline cases of being in the
macrostate M0, specified by the macroscopic variables S0,T0,V0, and D0.
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The vagueness of WPH is revealed when we connect the macroscopic variables
to the microscopic ones. Which set of microstates realizes the macrostate M0? There
is hardly any sharp boundary between those that do and those that do not realize the
macrostate. A macrostate, after all, is a coarse-grained description of the physical
state. As with many cases of coarse-graining, there can be borderline cases. (To
connect to our discussion in §2.1, the vagueness of macrostates is similar to the
vagueness of “is bald” and “is a table.”) In fact, a macrostate can be vague even
when it is specified with precise values of the macro-variables. This point should be
familiar to those working in the foundations of statistical mechanics.29 However, it is
worth spelling out the reasons to understand where and why such vagueness exists.
Let us begin by considering the case of temperature, a macroscopic variable
in thermodynamics. Take, for example, the macrostate of having temperature
T = 273.15K (i.e. 0°C or 32F). It is sometimes suggested without qualifications that
temperature just is average kinetic energy, giving the impression that temperature is
exact (because average kinetic energy is exact). The oversimplification is harmless
for all practical purposes. However, in our case the qualifications matter. In fact,
temperature is vague, even when we use a precise number such as T = 273.15K.
Moreover, it is overdetermined that it is vague.
According to kinetic theory of gas, temperature has a microscopic meaning. For
example, the temperature of an ideal gas in equilibrium is proportional to its average





where Ē represents the average kinetic energy of the gas molecules, kB is the Boltzmann
constant, and Tk represents the thermodynamic temperature of the gas. Assuming
that the collection of gas molecules is an exact notion, and that each molecule has
an exact value of (translational) kinetic energy, then the average kinetic energy of
the gas is an exact quantity, which equals the sum of kinetic energies divided by the
number of molecules. The constant 32 is obviously exact. If kB has an exact value, then
Tk also has an exact value, for the ideal gas at equilibrium. In this case, for certain
ideal gasses in equilibrium, they will have the exact temperature T = 273.15K.
However, vagueness enters from at least two sources: (1) the Boltzmann constant
and (2) thermal equilibrium. The upshot is that having temperature T = 273.15K is
vague and admits borderline cases: for some gasses in the world, it is not determinate
whether they are in the macroscopic state of having temperature T = 273.15K.
First, the Boltzmann constant, kB, does not seem to have an exact value known to
nature (unless we commit to untraceable arbitrariness to be explained in §3.3). kB is
a physical constant different from those that occur in the dynamical laws, such as the
gravitational constant G in F = Gm1m2/r2. Unlike G in the law of gravitation, kB is
29Commenting on the vagueness of the macrostate boundaries, Loewer (2007) writes, “Obviously,
the notion of macro state is vague and there are many precisifications that would serve the purposes of
statistical mechanics.” Goldstein et al. (2020) write, “there is some arbitrariness in where exactly to
‘draw the boundaries.”’
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Figure 3: A phase diagram of the triple point of water. Picture by Matthieumarechal,
CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>, via Wikimedia
Commons.
a scaling constant, playing the role of bridging the microscopic scales of molecules
and the macroscopic scales of gas in a box. In this sense, kB is like the Avogadro
number NA. Just as there is no sharp boundary between the microscopic and the
macroscopic, there is no sharp boundary between different values of any macroscopic
variable. Historically, kB is a measured quantity with respect to the triple point of
water, a particular state of water where the solid, liquid, and vapor phases of water
can coexist in a stable equilibrium (see Figure 3). The triple point also serves as a
reference point for T = 273.15K. But the picture is highly idealized and assumes a
sharp transition that would naturally stand for the triple point. In fact, for any body
of water in the real world, there is no single point that is aptly named the “triple
point.” At best, there is a quick but smooth transition that only becomes a sudden
jump in the infinite limit (e.g. as the number of particles goes to infinity), which
does not obtain in the real world. Given the smoothness of the transition, there is no
sharp boundary to draw between states that count as T = 273.15K and states that
do not, between states that count as T = 273.15K and states that count as borderline
T = 273.15K, and so on. And the same issue likely carries over to any phase transition
or critical point we encounter. That is the first source of vagueness.30
Second, the notion of thermal equilibrium is not exact. To apply Equation (1)
and calculate the temperature of some real gas in front of us, we need to adjust the
equation and account for any differences between the ideal gas law and the real
30One could of course stipulate an exact value for kB. This is actually done recently, at the 26th
meeting of the General Conference on Weights and Measures, to define kB with an exact value
instead of referring to it as a measured quantity. See www.bipm.org/en/CGPM/db/26/1. We should
understand the redefinition as a practical instruction for conventionally setting international standards
for measurements and calculations. But as for the constant kB known to Nature, if it has an exact
value, it would contain untraceable arbitrariness. See §3.3.
21
gas. Suppose that can be done without introducing any additional vagueness. To
apply the corrected equation, it still needs to be the case that the gas is in thermal
equilibrium.
However, some gasses are borderline cases of being in thermal equilibrium. For
any gas in a box, thermal equilibrium is the “most likely” state. It is a state that
(roughly) requires that the positions of the gas molecules to be evenly distributed
in the box and their velocities conform to a particular Gaussian distribution (the
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution). However, the uniform distribution in positions
and the Gaussian distribution in velocities obtain in the infinite limit (as the number
of gas molecules goes to infinity) and almost never in the real world (when the gas
only has a finite number of molecules). For example, a gas of 100 billion molecules
almost never has exactly 50 billion on the left half of the box and 50 billion on the
right half, just as an unbiased coin flipped 100 billion times almost never produces
exactly 50 billion heads and exactly 50 billion tails (it only approaches 50/50 as the
number of flips tends to infinity). So, to avoid making equilibrium an “unlikely
state,” we accept the modification that a gas is in equilibrium if its gas molecules
are more or less uniformly distributed in positions and more or less of the Gaussian
distribution in velocities. Hence, a gas of 100 billion molecules can be in equilibrium
when exactly 50 billion is in the left half of the box and exactly 50 billion is in the
right half of the box; but it can stay in equilibrium if there is one more molecule on
the left and one fewer on the right; and it can still stay in equilibrium if there are two
more on the left and two fewer on the right; and so on.31 But when does the gas stop
being in equilibrium and start being in non-equilibrium? What is the exact meaning
of “more or less” in the modified definition? We can use the strategy in §2.1 and
run a sorites argument here similar to the one on “bald.” Hence, there are real gasses
in the world that have the required average kinetic energy ĒT but nonetheless are
borderline cases of thermal equilibrium. Thus, such gasses are borderline cases of
having temperature T = 273.15K.32 Moreover, there are borderline borderline cases.
Suppose a gas with 50 billion - 20 million molecules on the left and 50 billion + 20
million on the right is a borderline case of thermal equilibrium. When do borderline
cases begin and when do they end? If we move molecules from the right to the left
one by one, eventually we reach determinate thermal equilibrium. However, it is
implausible that there is a sharp transition from borderline thermal equilibrium to
determinate thermal equilibrium. Hence, there are borderline borderline cases. The
argument iterates, yielding borderline borderline borderline cases and so on. That is
higher-order vagueness.
Since neither the Boltzmann constant nor thermal equilibrium is exact, it is
overdetermined that the macrostate of T = 273.15K is vague. The same goes for any
other particular temperature, and any particular level of entropy, pressure, and so
on. We have similar reasons to think that almost every other macroscopic variable,
31To fully describe thermal equilibrium, we need to coarse-grain more finely into smaller cells than
just two halves, and we need to consider momentum degrees of freedom. But the point made above
easily generalizes.
32A moment’s reflection suggests that invoking “local equilibrium” does not help; it faces the same
problem of vagueness.
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Figure 4: A diagram of phase space where macrostates have fuzzy boundaries. The
macrostate M0 represents the initial low-entropy condition described by WPH. X0 is
the actual initial microstate. The picture is not drawn to scale.
as used in thermodynamics and scientific practice, is vague. Hence, we have good
reasons to think that WPH is vague: there are some worlds whose initial conditions
are borderline cases of macrostate M0.
There is a more systematic way to think about the vagueness of the thermo-
dynamic macrostates in general and the vagueness of M0 in the WPH. In the
Boltzmannian account of classical statistical mechanics, macrostates and microstates
can be understood as certain structures on phase space (Figure 4).
• Phase space: in classical mechanics, phase space is a 6N-dimensional space
that encodes all the microscopic possibilities of the system.
• Microstate: a point in phase space, which is a maximally specific description of
a system. In classical mechanics, the microstate specifies the positions and the
momenta of all particles.
• Macrostate: a region in phase space in which the points inside are macroscopi-
cally similar, which is a less detailed and more coarse-grained description of a
system. The largest macrostate is thermal equilibrium.
• Fuzziness: the partition of phase space into macrostates is not exact; the
macrostates have fuzzy boundaries. Their boundaries become exact only
given some choices of the “C-parameters”, including the size of cells for
coarse-graining and the correspondence between distribution functions and
macroscopic variables.
• Entropy: S(x) = kBlog∣M(x)∣, where ∣ ⋅ ∣ denotes the standard volume measure
in phase space. Because of Fuzziness, in general, the (Boltzmann) entropy of a
system is not exact.
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We can translate WPH into the language of phase space: at one temporal boundary
of space-time, the microstate of the universe X0 lies inside a particular macrostate
M0 that has low volume in phase space. This shows that the derived properties
invoked by WPH can be re-expressed in terms of the fundamental properties (volume
of microstates in some region of phase space, which can be further expressed as
Lebesgue measure of sets of ordered 6N-tuples of positions and momenta of particles).
Unlike properties such as tigerhood, and more like acceleration, thermodynamic
properties such as temperature and entropy are more natural and more easily re-
expressed in terms of fundamental properties. Hence, the re-expressed version of
WPH can satisfy even the strict criterion that only allows fundamental properties to
appear in fundamental laws.
Fuzziness is crucial for understanding the vagueness and higher-order vagueness
of macrostates. Without specifying the exact values (or exact ranges of values) of
the C-parameters, the macrostates have fuzzy boundaries: some microstates are
borderline cases for certain macrostates, some are borderline borderline cases, and so
on. The fuzzy boundary of M0 illustrates the existence of borderline microstates and
higher-order vagueness. There will be a precise identification of macrostates with
sets of microstates only when we exactly specify the C-parameters (or their ranges).
In other words, there is a precise partition of microstates on phase space into regions
that are macroscopically similar (macrostates) only when we make some arbitrary
choices about what the C-parameters are. In such situations, the WPH macrostate
M0 would correspond to an exact set Γ0 on phase space, and the initial microstate
has to be contained in Γ0.
However, proponents of the WPH do not specify a precise set. A precise set
Γ0 would require more precision than is given in statistical mechanics—it requires
the specific values of the coarse-grained cells and the specific correspondence with
distribution functions. (In the standard quantum case discussed in Appendix, it
also requires the precise cut-off threshold for when a superposition belongs to a
macrostate.) The precise values of the C-parameters could be added to the theory to
make WPH into a precise statement (which we call the Strong Past Hypothesis in §3.3).
But they are nowhere to be found in the proposal, and rightly so.33
Some choices of the C-parameters are clearly unacceptable. If the coarse-graining
cells are too large, they cannot reflect the variations in the values of macroscopic
variables; if the coarse-graining cells are too small, they may not contain enough
gas molecules to be statistically significant. Hence, they have to be macroscopically
small but microscopically large (Albert (2000) p.44(fn.5) and Goldstein et al. (2020)).
However, if we were to make the parameters (or the ranges of parameters) more
and more precise, beyond a certain point, any extra precision in the choice would
seem completely arbitrary. They correspond to how large the cells are and which
function is the correct one when defining the relation between temperature and
sets of microstates. That does not seem to correspond to any objective facts in the
world. (How large is large enough and how small is small enough?) In this respect,
33For example, see descriptions of SWPH and WPH in Goldstein (2001), Albert (2000), and Carroll
(2010).
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the arbitrariness in precise C-parameters is quite unlike that in the fundamental
dynamical constants. (In §3.3, we discuss their differences in terms of a theoretical
virtue called ‘traceability.’) Moreover, not only do we lack precise parameters, we
also lack a precise set of permissible parameters (hence no exact ranges of values
for the C-parameters). There shouldn’t be sharp boundaries anywhere. Suppose
size m is borderline large enough and size n is determinately large enough. Small
changes from m will eventually get us to n, but it is implausible that there is a sharp
transition from borderline large enough to determinately large enough. Similarly,
there shouldn’t be a sharp transition between borderline large enough to borderline
borderline large enough, and so on. That is higher-order vagueness.
Because of higher-order vagueness, we need to take standard mathematical
representation of WPH with a grain of salt. The macroscopic variables—adjustable
parameters in WPH—need to be coarse-grained enough to respect the vagueness.
For example, we may represent the temperature of M0 as 1032 degrees Kelvin. But
temperature does not have the exactness of real numbers. A more careful way to
represent the vague temperature should be “1032-ish degrees Kelvin,” where the “-ish”
qualifier signifies that temperature is vague and the number 1032 is only an imperfect
mathematical representation.34 Its exactness is artificial. Hence, WPH should be
characterized as a macrostate M0 specified by S0-ish entropy, T0-ish temperature, and
so on.
The vagueness here is appropriate, since macroscopic variables only make sense
when there are enough degrees of freedom (such as a large number of particles). In
practice, however, such vagueness rarely matters: there will be enough margins such
that to explain the thermodynamic phenomena, which are themselves vague, we
do not need the extra exactness. The vagueness disappears for all practical purposes.
Nevertheless, WPH is a genuine case of fundamental nomic vagueness and it is a
possibility to take seriously.
3.3 Untraceable Arbitrariness of the Strong Past Hypothesis
For the sake of completeness, I consider the possibility of an exact version of PH.
Suppose there is an exact law known to nature and the vagueness of WPH is only
epistemic: there is, in fact, a precise set Γ0 with exact boundaries on phase space that
stands in for the initial macrostate. I formulate it as follows:
Strong Past Hypothesis (SPH) At one temporal boundary of space-time, the mi-
crostate of the universe is in Γ0, where Γ0 corresponds to a particular admissible
precisification of M0.
Unlike WPH, SPH is exact. As such, it is mathematically expressible. However, as I
explain below, SPH violates a plausible feature that every other fundamental law and
dynamical constant satisfies: SPH is “untraceable.” The exact boundary of Γ0 does
not “leave a trace” in typical worlds compatible with it. Hence, SPH is arbitrary in a
34Thanks to Alan Hájek for discussions here.
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way that other exact fundamental postulates in physics are not. Moreover, it widens
the gap between the ontic and the nomic. Other things being equal, that seems to
make it less appealing among proposals for understanding PH as a fundamental law.
On the epistemic interpretation of vagueness, there is in fact an exact number of
hairs, n, that turns someone from being bald to being non-bald. But the number n is
not known to us. In fact, it cannot be known to us in any way. Similarly, there are in
fact exact boundaries of the macrostate M0, represented by the set of microstates Γ0 on
phase space. The exact set can be picked out only by the unhelpful description “the
set that is invoked by the SPH.” Which set it is is unknown and likely unknowable by
empirical investigations (as I explain below). However, many things that are true of
nature may be unknown or unknowable to us, as a consequence of certain physical
laws. There are examples of in-principle limitations of knowledge in well-defined
physical theories such as Bohmian mechanics and GRW collapse theories (Cowan and
Tumulka (2016)). Moreover, we may not know the exact values of the fundamental
constants and the fundamental dynamical laws, if not forever then at least for a
long time. Hence, knowledge and knowability about the precise boundaries of Γ0
is not the issue, for they may also arise for other fundamental laws and dynamical
constants that we think are fine. Neither is the problem that the postulate of a precise
set Γ0 would be a brute fact that is not explained further. Every other fundamental
law or dynamical constant is supposed to be also brute and not explained further (in
the scientific sense and not in the metaphysical sense of explanation).
What sets the arbitrariness of SPH apart from that of the dynamical constants
and other fundamental laws is its untraceability. The exact boundaries of SPH are
typically untraceable. There are infinitely many ways to change the boundaries of Γ0
that do not lead to any differences for most worlds SPH deems possible. Hence, Γ0
does not leave a trace in most worlds compatible with it.
Let me make this notion of traceability more precise. It is plausible that the
objective features of the world are reflected in the changes in the properties of
particles, the field configurations, the mass densities, the space-time geometry, and
so on. Such changes do not have to be measured or measurable by human beings.
But for the familiar fundamental laws and their dynamical constants, typical changes
in their exact values will be “felt” by the matter distributions (or some other part of
the fundamental ontology excluding the fundamental laws) in the nomologically
possible worlds. That is, there are some worldly features in the fundamental material
ontology that are sensitive to typical changes in the “nomology.” For example, any
changes in the gravitational constant G will be felt by the massive objects and will
change (however slightly or significantly) the motion of planets around stars, the
formation of galaxies, and the distribution of fundamental matter. On a closer scale,
it affects how exactly my vase shatters when it hits the ground. In other words, there
should be some traces in the material ontology of the world. If the value of G had been
different, the material ontology would have been different. We can capture this idea
modally as changes in the nomological status (from possible to impossible) or the
objective (conditional) probability (e.g. from 0.8 to 0.3 given prior histories) of the
world. We formulate the following condition on traceability:
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Traceability-at-a-World A certain adjustable parameter O in the physical law L is
traceable at world w if any change in O (while holding other parameters fixed)
will result in some change in the nomological status of w with respect to L, i.e.
from possible to impossible or from likely to unlikely (or some other change in
the probabilistic measures).
We are treating “adjustable parameter” in a loose sense. For example, in the case of
Newtonian theory with gravitation FG = ma ∧ FG = Gm1m2/r2, we can adjust it in the
following (independent) ways:
• Change the constant G= 6.67430 to G’=6.68 (in the appropriate unit);
• Change division by r2 to division by r2.001;
• Change the multiplication by m1 to multiplication by m1.000011 .
All such changes are traceable at typical worlds that satisfy Newton’s law of motion
and law of universal gravitation. For a typical Newtonian world whose microscopic
history h is a solution to the Newtonian laws, h will not be possible given any of
those changes. In other words, it will change a typical history h from nomologically
possible to nomologically impossible with respect to Newtonian theory of gravitation.
Here, we are interested in traceability at most worlds that are allowed by L. This is
because there may be cases where for “accidental” reasons two different values of O
may produce the same world w in exact microscopic details; a change of the value
of O does not change w from possible to impossible or change its probability. Such
cases would be atypical. The relevant property is this:
Traceability A certain adjustable parameter O in the physical law L is traceable if O
is traceable at most worlds allowed by L.35
If some degree of freedom O is traceable at most worlds, then at most worlds
(typically) the value of O can be determined to arbitrary microscopic precision. Then,
normally, the more information we know about the actual world the more precise
we can determine the value of O. However, what matters is not our epistemic access.
For typical worlds compatible with L, if it is deterministic, most worlds will only
admit one value of O. That is the case for the gravitational constant G.
Similarly, the laws and dynamical constants of Maxwellian electrodynamics are
traceable; those of Bohmian mechanics are traceable; those of Everettian quantum
theory are traceable; those of special and general relativity are traceable. In those
theories, there is a tight connection between the nomic and the ontic. Typically the
precision of the laws leaves traces in the material ontology.
35Here “most” is with respect to some natural measure in the state space such as the Lebesgue
measure in phase space or normalized surface area measure on the unit sphere in Hilbert space. The
threshold for most is vague. As such, there may be borderline cases of traceable parameters. This is
to be expected, as traceability is supposed to be a theoretical virtue; like other theoretical virtues, it
can be vague. But the examples we encounter here are clear-cut.
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Figure 5: A diagram of phase space where macrostates have exact boundaries. Γ0
and Γ′0 are two admissible precisifications of M0. The actual initial microstate X0 lies
inside both.
A stochastic theory such as GRW presents an interesting wrinkle. The GRW theory
postulates two fundamental constants: the collapse rate λ and the collapse width
σ. Consider just the collapse rate λ that describes the probability of collapse (per-
particle-per-unit-time). Since it is a probabilistic theory, the same history of quantum
states can be compatible with distinct values of λ. What λ does is to provide a
probability measure (together with a slightly-modified Born-rule probability measure)
that tells us which collapse histories are typical (or very probable) and which are
not. However, each micro-history receives zero measure. It is the macro-history
(considered as a set of micro-histories that are macroscopically similar) that can
receive positive probabilities. Hence, in a stochastic theory, we should understand
the appropriate change of nomological status as changes in the probabilistic measure
of the macro-history that the micro-history realizes.
Although familiar laws in physics are traceable, SPH is not. To see this, consider Γ0
and another set Γ′0 that has slightly different boundaries (see Figure 5). Suppose both
are admissible precisifications of M0 and both include the actual initial microstate X0
as a member. Then the world starting in microstate X0 is compatible with SPH and
another law SPH’ that slightly alters the boundaries of Γ0. Moreover, this is the case
for typical worlds compatible with Γ0: at most worlds compatible with Γ0, slightly
altering the boundaries of Γ0 will not make a difference to the nomological status of
most worlds. (At some atypical worlds very close to the boundaries of Γ0, altering
the boundaries will take them from being possible to being impossible or vice versa.)
For most worlds inside Γ0, there will be infinitely many changes to the boundaries of
Γ0 that do not affect the probabilities of those worlds.
Hence, SPH is not traceable.36 And there lies the key difference between SPH and
36Because of higher-order vagueness, the same will be true for a disjunctive version of SPH that
says that the initial microstate belongs to a determinate set of precisifications, such as: X0 is in Γ0 or
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other fundamental laws and constants. The former is arbitrary in a way the latter
are not: SPH has untraceable arbitrariness. For traceable laws and constants such
as G, their values may be arbitrarily precise; their values are not explained further.
However, they still respect a close connection between the nomic and the ontic: their
exact values are reflected in the material ontology. That is not the case of SPH; the
exact boundaries of Γ0 outrun the ontic; the exact choice of Γ0 is not reflected in the
material ontology. Other things being equal, we should minimize the gap between the ontic
and the nomic. (To emphasize: this is different from the gap between the nomic and
what’s epistemically accessible, for plenty of facts about the material ontology may
forever lie beyond our epistemic ken.)
It is implausible that we can appeal to super-empirical virtues to pin down Γ0.
Take for example the theoretical virtue of simplicity. It is unlikely that there will be a
simplest precisification of M0, just as it is unlikely there is a simplest choice of the
coarse-graining size (or other C-parameters).37 Furthermore, those theoretical virtues
are themselves vague. In cases where Nature is kind to us, there may be a choice that
is by far the simplest (or best balances various virtues) that their vagueness makes
no difference. However, although we may have faith in Nature’s kindness, we have
no reason to think that SPH is such a case.
Endorsing SPH leads to endorsing some untraceable arbitrariness in Nature.
Although it is not impossible Nature acts in this strange way, if every other funda-
mental postulate and dynamical constant in physics seems to respect traceability,
conservativeness suggests that we try to keep it if we can. We should respect the
tight connection between the nomic and the ontic by not letting in untreaceable
arbitrariness.
Is WPH also untraceably arbitrary? No. Let me explain in what sense WPH
is traceable. WPH (see Figure 4) does not delineate the nomological possibilities
as a set of microstates with sharp boundaries. Instead, it selects a fuzzy region—
M0.38 WPH is stated in the vague macro language: the initial macrostate has S0-ish
entropy, T0-ish temperature, and so on. The vagueness of the “-ish” tolerates small
differences in values: “20-ish” and “20.0001-ish” are equivalent representations of the
same macrostate. Thus, slight variations of WPH will not produce different vague
laws. Adjusting the entropy value from S0 to S0 + ε will select the same fuzzy region,
as long as ε is small enough. Moreover, increasing entropy by too much will produce
observable, macroscopic differences in most worlds compatible with WPH (e.g. from
low entropy to high entropy). Of course, what counts as small enough and what
counts as too much will be vague. Now, even though not all traceable differences are






37Penrose (1979)’s Weyl curvature hypothesis (WCP) is a simple and exact version of the low-
entropy initial condition in classical relativity. But by itself it seems insufficient to explain the records
asymmetry (Rovelli 2020). Moreover, the quantum generalization of WCP (Ashtekar and Gupt 2016)
is vague.
38Here it may be useful to follow Sainsbury (1990)’s suggestion: we should not be speaking of
“boundaries” at all, for there is only one kind of boundary. Hence, a fuzzy region is perhaps a better
mental imagery.
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vague WPH is not untraceably arbitrary.
Interestingly, although traceability seems like a novel theoretical virtue, it provides
another explanation for people’s negative attitudes towards the quantum measure-
ment axioms. Many philosophers of physics are unfriendly towards fundamental yet
vague quantum measurement axioms, but some of them can accept a fundamental
WPH. Both are vague. What can be a principled reason that distinguishes the two
cases? There are in fact two reasons. First, there is the ideal of unification mentioned
in §2.5. The second reason, which has so far been under-appreciated, is that the exact
alternative of WPH is untraceable, while the exact alternative of the measurement
axioms is in fact traceable; different cut-offs in the law will typically lead to differences
in the fundamental material ontology. A particular simple alternative to the vague
measurement axiom is provided by the GRW theory. Exact values of the GRW
adjustable parameters (collapse width, collapse rate, and probability of the collapse
center) leave traces in the material world.
It is difficult to formulate precise theory-choice principles, but here is a proposal:
other things being equal, if we can avoid fundamental nomic vagueness without introducing
untraceable arbitrariness, we should prefer an exact alternative; but if we can do it only
by introducing untraceable arbitrariness, then a fundamental yet vague law is perfectly
acceptable and should be preferred to the exact alternative. Given the proviso “other
things being equal,” the principle should be applied very carefully. We should treat
fundamental nomic vagueness as a defeasible indicator that can, in some cases, reveal
the deeper defect in the theory. For example, the vagueness of textbook quantum
mechanics indicates that the theory lacks a unified explanation, where the precise
alternative GRW not only ensures exactness but also provides “unified dynamics
for microscopic and macroscopic systems” (Ghirardi et al. 1986). However, since
the indicator is defeasible, some theories can contain fundamental nomic vagueness
and yet be perfectly fine as candidate fundamental theories, such as the case of the
classical statistical mechanics with WPH (the Mentaculus). In that case, fundamental
nomic exactness is not worth the price, for it would make the theory untraceably
arbitrary; fundamental nomic vagueness is not a symptom of some deeper disunity in
the Mentaculus, as the theory aspires to be a unified explanation of the fundamental
and the non-fundamental sciences.
I have not provided a decisive argument for the theory-choice principle. For
people desiring to avoid fundamental nomic vagueness at all costs, they can reject
the principle and choose SPH over WPH as the fundamental boundary-condition
law. Therefore, a more neutral way to summarize the findings so far is that we face a
dilemma: either accept vague fundamental laws such as SWPH and WPH, or violate
traceability by adopting SPH. There is no free lunch in Nature; either way we have
to pay.
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4 Fundamental Nomic Exactness without Untraceable Arbitrari-
ness
Is the dilemma an essential feature in any theory that includes a fundamental law of
a low-entropy boundary-condition? In this section, I consider under what conditions
the dilemma may be dissolved. It turns out that the dilemma is essential if our world
is classical but dissolvable if our world is quantum. Here I focus on the conceptual
elements and leave the technical details to the Appendix.
The dilemma arises for PH because of its role in the fundamental physical theory.
In the Mentaculus, the micro-dynamical laws (such as F = ma) suffice to explain
the entire history of every microstate, and PH is brought into the theory to explain
why most nomologically possible microstates should display the macroscopic time-
asymmetric regularities, such as those summarized in the Second Law. It does
so by “throwing out” most microstates that do not display the regularities. How-
ever, the explanandum—the time-asymmetric regularities—are vague, macroscopic
phenomena about temperature, entropy and the like. Hence, a vague law such
as WPH would suffice as the explanans and an exact law such as SPH would be
overly precise. In contrast, micro-dynamical laws are traceable; their explanandum
are exact, microscopic phenomena (e.g. the relative distances of point particles).
This observations leads to an interesting possibility: if the low-entropy boundary
condition somehow appears in the micro-dynamical equations, perhaps an exact
version of PH will no longer be untraceably arbitrary.
In §3.3, SPH is formulated as a constraint on X0, the initial classical state of the
universe, which represents the positions and momenta of all the particles. The Γ0
stipulated by SPH does not appear in the traceable dynamical equation F = ma. In
realist theories of quantum mechanics, SPH can be formulated as a constraint on
the initial quantum state of the universe, represented by a wave function, Ψ0. Still,
the exact boundary stipulated by SPH does not appear in the traceable dynamical
equation (the Schödinger equation). As such, the quantum version of SPH contains
the same vice as the classical one—untraceable arbitrariness. Thus, we can similarly
argue that we should prefer the quantum WPH over the quantum SPH.
However, quantum theory contains a more general kind of quantum states,
represented by density matrices. It has been recognized for many years that the
fundamental quantum state of the universe may be in such a state, which we shall
call W, and it would have the same observable consequences as one represented
by Ψ. In parallel with the realist quantum theories with a fundamental Ψ, there
have been developments of W-versions of Bohmian mechanics where W directly
guides Bohmian particles, GRW collapse theories where W undergoes spontaneous
collapses, and Everettian theories where W strictly obeys the von Neumann equation
and realizes an emergent multiverse. The viability of the W-theories as an alternative
to Ψ-theories transforms the situation about fundamental nomic vagueness and
untraceable arbitrariness in a quantum world. It is good news for the dissolving
the dilemma, but this strategy has so far been under-appreciated (likely because
fundamental nomic vagueness is under-appreciated).
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Here is the innovation allowed by W-theories: the fundamental quantum state of
the universe is initially W0 (a density matrix), and we further stipulate that W0 is the
simplest quantum state (the normalized projection) corresponding to a particular
precisification of a low-entropy macrostate (represented by HPH). In Chen (2018,
2020a), I call this the Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH). IPH is a new proposal of the
fundamental law of a low-entropy boundary condition that replaces (quantum) SPH.
I call the package of IPH and fundamental dynamical laws the Wentaculus. Unlike
SPH and WPH in standard Ψ-quantum theories, IPH selects a unique quantum
state—it is stipulated to be both the actual one and the only nomologically possible
one. (Yet, IPH remains simple insofar as HPH is simple.) IPH is exact but also
traceable. It is exact because, unlike WPH, IPH admits no borderline worlds; slight
changes of W0 will produce different laws. It is traceable because, unlike SPH, slight
differences in W0 will leave traces in the material ontology. The dilemma is dissolved
here because W0 plays two roles at t0: it corresponds to the low-entropy macrostate
and also appears in the microscopic equations. It becomes traceable because of its
second role, while standard exact versions of PH do not play the second role and
are untraceable. Moreover, for each realist theory, its W-version is no less simple
or theoretically virtuous. In fact, one could argue that with IPH, there is a greater
degree of unification of quantum theory with temporal asymmetry.
The strategy does not work in a classical world. One could try to replace SPH+SP
with a probability distribution ρ (which is analogous to W) and somehow use it to
guide the motion of classical particles. But it would be awkward: it would either
multiply the ontology to particles and the physical counterpart of ρ, or complicates the
simple dynamics of F = ma by introducing stochastic jumps. Alternatively, one could
completely throw out the classical particles and represent the material ontology
with ρ. But again, without changing the deterministic dynamics to a stochastic one,
one would have to embrace a many-worlds interpretation even in a classical world,
because ρ would deterministically evolve to be supported on different macrostates.
All of these changes are artificial. Thus, in a classical world, the exact alternative to
WPH is not worth the price, and a vague WPH is perfectly fine. The proviso of the
theory-choice principle in §3.3 is not satisfied, as other things are clearly not equal.
5 Conclusion
Fundamental nomic vagueness is vagueness in the fundamental laws of nature. On
the proposed account, to find out whether a fundamental law is vague, we check
whether it admits borderline nomologically possible worlds, lacks a well-defined
extension, carries sorites-susceptibility, and possesses higher-order vagueness. If the
account is intelligible, which I think it is, then fundamental laws of nature is a new
place to look for vagueness. The account leaves room for vague chances, which is left
for future work. I also leave to future work how fundamental nomic vagueness can
impact theories of causation, counterfactuals, and scientific explanation.
On a widespread view where fundamental laws are metaphysically fundamental,
fundamental nomic vagueness is a “worldly” kind of vagueness. On such a view,
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vagueness of fundamental laws implies vagueness of certain fundamental facts of
the world. However, fundamental nomic vagueness differs from standard cases
of ontic vagueness, as the latter but not the former concerns the vague identity,
spatio-temporal boundaries, or parts of material objects.
It is surprising, whether from a Humean or a non-Humean perspective, that
actual fundamental laws of nature can be vague. We might expect all fundamental
laws to be completely and faithfully expressible by precise mathematical equations. That
expectation will be mistaken if actual fundamental laws include vague ones such as
WPH and if higher-order vagueness is not completely mathematically expressible.
One can use SPH to eliminate vagueness by fiat. However, it introduces untraceable
arbitrariness that is absent in any other fundamental laws or dynamical constants.
Interestingly, the dilemma between fundamental nomic vagueness and untrace-
ability is dissolved when we directly use the initial macrostate to dictate (or describe)
the motion of fundamental material objects, such as when we postulate IPH in
density-matrix quantum theories. Hence, another surprising lesson is that, far
from making the world vague, the innovations of quantum theory can eliminate
fundamental nomic vagueness without introducing untraceable arbitrariness in
Nature. Does it follow we should prefer the density-matrix theories with IPH over
the wave-function theories with WPH? That is an open question, as we need to
carefully consider their strengths and weaknesses, and whether other things are equal.
Fundamental nomic vagueness provides a relevant desideratum for theory-choice. A
related question, which I did not fully address in this paper, is the value of preserving
complete mathematical expressibility of fundamental physical laws.
In current and future physics, there may be other cases of fundamental nomic
vagueness that cannot be eliminated in a similar manner and cases of arbitrariness
that have a different character. Then one’s position on the metaphysics of laws
could make a difference to how one should deal with fundamental nomic vagueness
and arbitrariness. As the case study shows, the issue is delicate and should not be
settled in advance. There are many interesting questions concerning metaphysics,
physics, and mathematics that can make a difference to how much we should tolerate
vagueness in the fundamental laws. Attending to those details may also teach us
something new about the nature of laws.
Appendix
First, I briefly explain the standard framework of the Boltzmannian account of
quantum statistical mechanics (Goldstein et al. (2020)), in parallel to that of the
classical statistical mechanics (§3.2):
• Hilbert space: Hilbert space is a vector space equipped with inner product
structure that encodes all the microscopic possibilities (possible worlds) of the
system (or the universe as a whole).
• Microstate: a vector in Hilbert space, a maximally specific description of a
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system.39
• Macrostate: a subspace in Hilbert space in which the quantum states contained
within are macroscopically similar, which is a less detailed and more coarse-
grained description of a system. The Hilbert space is orthogonally decomposed
into subspaces.
• Fuzziness: the decomposition of Hilbert space into macrostates is not deter-
minate; the macrostates have fuzzy boundaries. Their boundaries become
exact only given some choices of the C-parameters, including the size of cells
for coarse-graining, the correspondence between distribution functions and
macroscopic variables, and the cut-off threshold for macrostate inclusion.
• Entropy: S(ψ) = kBdimH , where dim denotes the dimension counting in
Hilbert space and H is the subspace that contains most of ψ. Higher-
dimensional subspaces tend to have higher entropies. Because of Fuzziness, in
general, the (Boltzmann) entropy of a system is not exact.
We can translate the WPH in the language of Hilbert space:
Quantum Weak Past Hypothesis (QWPH) At one temporal boundary of space-
time, the wave function of the universe is in a particular macrostate M0, where
M0 is the low-entropy macrostate characterized by the Big Bang cosmology.
SP would take the following form:
Quantum Statistical Postulate (QSP) At one temporal boundary of space-time, the
probability distribution is the uniform one (with respect to the normalized
surface area measure on the unit sphere) over wave functions compatible with
QWPH.
Second, I explain the new strategy of reconciling fundamental nomic exactness
with traceability. Recent works in the foundations of quantum mechanics suggest that
density matrices can directly represent fundamental quantum states.40 Chen (2018)
calls the view density matrix realism. On density matrix realism, the fundamental
state of the universe is mixed rather than pure and it has to be described by a density
matrix rather than a wave function. The density matrix is not merely epistemic.
Since the density matrix is fundamental, the fundamental micro-dynamics needs to be
revised (e.g. à la Allori et al. (2013)) to reflect the change: we replace the Schrödinger
equation with the von Neumann equation, the Bohmian guidance equation with
another that uses the density matrix as an input, the GRW collapse equations with
another that stochastically evolves the density matrix, and various definitions of local
beables from the wave function with their density-matrix counterparts. Moreover,
39It is possible to have additional ontologies such as the Bohmian particles and the GRW mass
densities.
40See, for example, Dürr et al. (2005), Maroney (2005), Wallace (2011, 2012), and Chen (2018).
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the density-matrix versions of Bohm, GRW, and Everett are empirically equivalent
to the respective wave-function versions.





where IPH designates the projection operator onto HPH and dim counts the dimension
of that subspace. I use this to formulate a new low-entropy initial condition for
density matrix realism:
Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH) At one temporal boundary of space-time, the
quantum state of the universe is exactly W0 as described in Equation (2).
This version of PH is exact. The combination of density matrix realism and IPH does
the heavy-lifting. The low-entropy initial condition is completely and unambiguously
described in W0. Unlike the SPH or its quantum version QSPH we encountered
earlier, W0 enters directly into the fundamental micro-dynamics. Hence, W0 will
be traceable and not objectionably arbitrary. To see that , consider two realist
interpretations of the quantum state (Chen (2019)):
1. W0 is ontological: if the initial density matrix represents something in the
fundamental material ontology, IPH is obviously traceable. Any changes to the
physical values of W0 will leave a trace in every world compatible with IPH.
2. W0 is nomological: if the initial density matrix is on a par with the fundamental
laws, then W0 plays the same role as the classical Hamiltonian function or
fundamental dynamical constant of nature. It is traceable in the Everettian
version with a matter-density ontology as the initial matter-density is obtained
from W0. It is similarly traceable in the GRW version with a matter-density
ontology. For the GRW version with a flash ontology, different choices of W0
will in general lead to different probabilities of the macro-histories. In the
Bohmian version, different choices of W0 will lead to different velocity fields
such that for typical initial particle configurations (and hence typical worlds
compatible with the theory) they will take on different trajectories.
The traceability of W0 is due to the fact that we have connected the low-entropy
macrostate (now represented by W0) to the micro-dynamics (in which W0 occurs).
Hence, W0 plays a dual role at t0 (and only at that time): it is both the microstate and
the macrostate. In contrast, the untraceability of Γ0 in the classical SPH is due to the
fact that classical equations of motion directly involve only the microstate X0, not
Γ0. Similarly, the H0 in the standard wave-function version of QSPH is untraceable
because the Schrödinger equation directly involves only the wave function, not H0.
There are many changes to Γ0 and to H0 that make no changes whatsoever in typical
worlds compatible with those postulates.
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